Towards a Ius Commune on Elections in Europe? The Role of the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters in ‘‘Harmonizing’’ Electoral Rights by Piccirilli, G & Fasone, C
Towards a Ius Commune on Elections in Europe?
The Role of the Code of Good Practice in Electoral
Matters in ‘‘Harmonizing’’ Electoral Rights
Cristina Fasone and Giovanni Piccirilli
ABSTRACT
The Venice Commission, set up in 1990 within the Council of Europe, sees the monitoring of elections and
referendums in the member states as one of its main tasks. In this particular field, the Venice Commission has
established a Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters and delivers opinions on electoral legislation on a
regular basis. Although formally speaking the Code and the opinions of this Commission are not legally bind-
ing upon member states, they enjoy great political authority and can certainly exert significant pressure on
the national legal systems, should a deviation from the Code be detected. Moreover, starting from 2007
the European Court of Human Rights has recognized the principles enshrined in the Code of Good Practice
in Electoral Matters as standards for its judgments. The article analyzes whether this development is actually
leading towards a convergence of the standards observed for electoral legislation in Europe. It is argued that,
while elements like the identification of the basic requirements for a free electoral competition may lead to
such a conclusion, this is not case for others, like in matters of electoral justice, where deep differences among
states appear to remain. Moreover, the inconsistency amongst the linguistic versions of the Code, as revealed
in the Italian case, proves it difficult for the Code to actually establish a ius commune on elections in Europe.
Keywords: electoral law, Venice Commission, European Court of Human Rights, European electoral her-
itage, soft law
INTRODUCTION
A s an advisory body created in 1990 withinthe Council of Europe, composed of indepen-
dent experts in the field of constitutional law, the Eu-
ropean Commission for Democracy through Law
(hereinafter the Venice Commission) sees the moni-
toring of elections and referendums in the member
states as one of its main tasks.1 It fulfils this task in
coordination and with the support of the Council for
Democratic Elections, by setting standards for demo-
cratic elections and then checking their compliance
at the domestic level. In this particular field, upon a
mandate of the bodies of the Council of Europe, the
Venice Commission has established a Code of Good
Practice in Electoral Matters (2002) and delivers
opinions on electoral legislation on a regular basis.
Although formally speaking the Code and the
opinions of this Commission are not legally binding
Cristina Fasone is an assistant professor of comparative public
law in the Department of Political Science at LUISS Guido
Carli University in Rome. Giovanni Piccirilli is an assistant pro-
fessor of constitutional law in the Department of Law at LUISS
Guido Carli University in Rome. While the authors jointly
drafted the introduction and the conclusion, Cristina Fasone
wrote the second section, and Giovanni Piccirilli authored the
third section.
1Other tasks refer to the review of national constitutional re-
forms and to the support of constitutional justice in the member
states. See Maartje De Visser, A Critical Assessment of the Role
of the Venice Commission in Processes of Domestic Constitu-
tional Reform, 63(4) Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (2015).
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upon member states, they enjoy great political au-
thority and can certainly exert significant pressure
on the national legal systems, should a deviation
from the Code be detected.2 Moreover, starting
from 2007 the European Court of Human Rights
(hereafter, ECtHR) has recognized the principles
enshrined in the Code of Good Practice in Electoral
Matters as standards for its judgments,3 following
its ‘‘entrenchment’’ in a Resolution of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (No.
1320/2003) and in a Declaration of the Committee
of Ministers (of 13 May 2004).
Is there a guardian of the good practices in elec-
toral matters in Europe? Does the role of the Venice
Commission favor the emergence of a ius commune
of electoral legislation in Europe? The article ana-
lyzes whether the ‘‘entrenchment’’ of the Code, cou-
pled with the activity and opinions of the Venice
Commission itself on the one hand and on the
other with the case law of the ECtHR on electoral
matters, is actually leading towards a convergence
of the standards observed for electoral legislation
in Europe. It is argued that, while elements like the
identification of the basic requirements for a free
electoral competition may lead to such a conclusion,
this is not case for others, like in matters of electoral
justice, where deep differences among states appear
to remain. Moreover, the inconsistency between the
official translations of the Code makes it difficult for
the Venice Commission to effectively act as a ‘‘har-
monizer’’ of good practices in electoral matters. This
feature is shown by using the Italian translation of
the Code regarding the resolution of disputes arising
during the electoral process that is patently different
from the other linguistic versions.
The article proceeds as follows: it first provides an
overview of the contents of the Code and discusses
its legal status; second, it focuses on the opinions—
those addressing different issues and most often cited
as references and precedents—of the Venice Commis-
sion as a vehicle of ‘‘harmonization’’ of electoral rules.
The word ‘‘harmonization’’ is not used here with the
meaning attached to it under EU law, namely, as the
adoption of ad hoc common rules aimed mainly—
albeit not exclusively—at achieving the objective of a
fully integrated internal market. Rather we refer to
the possibility that, thanks to the use and application
of the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters,
the Venice Commission and the ECtHR could indi-
rectly promote the consolidation of a ius commune
on elections in Europe. The article then assesses how
the Code has been used by the ECtHR case law,4
once again as a ‘‘harmonizing’’ force towards electoral
legislation(s) in Europe. In this regard, it should be
noted, however, that the legitimation and authority
of the two bodies, the Venice Commission and the
ECtHR, are fairly different. The former is an indepen-
dent consultative body composed of legal experts from
61 member states (14 more than the members of the
Council of Europe) with a limited mandate compared
to the scope of the ECtHR. The latter, instead, is an in-
ternational court issuing binding judgments on the con-
tracting parties, whose members are elected by the
Parliamentary Assembly from a list of candidates pro-
vided by each state and whose reputation has gradually
increased since the activation of individual applications
(Protocol XI). Finally, drawing on the Italian case, the
article highlights a peculiar and overlooked weakness
of this Code as regards its ability to create a ius com-
mune on elections in Europe, namely the discrepancy
amongst its linguistic versions.
EXPECTATIONS TOWARDS
A ‘‘HARMONIZATION’’ OF ELECTORAL
RIGHTS IN EUROPE
The Code as a distillation of the ‘‘European
electoral heritage’’
The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters
aims to acknowledge and codify in a single docu-
ment principles, conventions, and practices observed
in the constitutional systems of most of the Council
of Europe’s member states, enshrined in international
2The issue of the nature of the Venice Commission’s opinion
can be linked to the general debate on the place of soft law in
international law: see, for example, Richard R. Baxter, Interna-
tional Law in ‘‘Her Infinite Variety,’’ 29(4) Int’l and
Comp. L.Q. 549 (1980), and Kenneth W. Abbott-Duncan Sni-
dal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 Int’l
Org. 421 (2000). Hence, the ‘‘juridification’’ of the content of
codes elaborated by private actors has been underlined by Gun-
ther Teubner, On the Linkage of ‘‘Private’’ and ‘‘Public’’ Cor-
porate Codes of Conduct, 18(2) Ind. J. Global Legal Stud.
17 (2001). A specific reflection on the role of standards in elec-
tions has been collected in the Council of Europe handbook for
civil society organizations, Using International Election
Standards (2016).
3Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs and Others v.
Russia, Nos. 55066/00 and 55638/00, x 37, ECtHR 2007.
4To this end, the research on the relevant case law has been ac-
complished by using the HUDOC database and searching for
the judgments where the Code was cited or quoted.
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covenants and that should represent the guidelines for
the holding of democratic elections.5 It was not
intended to impose new binding rules. Paradoxically,
it is exactly its non-innovative nature that appears to
constitute a ‘‘strong’’ point in favor of its authorita-
tiveness and prestige.
As it is based on a distillation of existing princi-
ples collected and systematized together and devel-
oped nationally and internationally, the legal value
of the Code depends on the norms to which it re-
fers. Along these lines, the references in the Code’s
ExplanatoryReport (ER), in particular art. 25, letter b
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and art. 3 of Protocol I to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR), are identified as
the ‘‘central nucleus’’ from which the content of the
‘‘European electoral heritage’’ develops.
There are five principles enshrined in the Code
and ‘‘underlying Europe’s electoral heritage’’ (Part I):
universal, equal, free, secret, and direct suffrage.
Part I of the Code is then organized according to
these five bulwarks of democratic elections, setting
guidelines on issues like electoral registers and par-
ity of sexes, as well as postal and proxy voting and
frequency of elections.
Instead, Part II is devoted to the conditions for
implementing the principles, from the respect of fun-
damental rights (I), to the stability of the electoral law
(II) and, finally, procedural guarantees (III).6 For ex-
ample, the Code emphasizes the importance of the
credibility of the electoral process (II.2), which is
influenced by the clarity of the rules for the voters
(x 63 ER), the tools to avoid party manipulation of
electoral legislation (x 64 ER), the timing of the elec-
toral change (so as to never reform electoral legisla-
tion within one year of elections, x 65 ER),7 and the
rank of electoral rules within the sources of law, pref-
erably statute law with the more technical questions
provided for by the regulations (x 67 ER).
As for the procedural safeguards (II.3), it is recom-
mended for instance, especially for ‘‘states with little
experience of organizing pluralist elections (x 70
ER),’’ to establish an independent, impartial, and per-
manent electoral commission as an administrative au-
thority, composed of experts on elections, in charge of
the organization of the vote (xx 71 to 85 ER). The
Code also specifies the optimal composition of such
an electoral commission. It should include a judge
or law officer, an equal representation of all political
parties with a seat in parliament or which have gained
more than a certain percentage of votes, representa-
tives of national minorities, and a representative of
the Ministry of the Interior. Finally, the Code also fo-
cuses on rules on the funding of political parties and
electoral campaigns (xx 107 to 111 ER) and an effec-
tive system of appeal (xx 92 to 103 ER).
At this point, it seems appropriate to dwell on the
legal nature of the Code. In fact, even though at a
first glance it appears to be reasonably straightfor-
ward (i.e., non-binding nature), the observation of
how it has been processed and the latest jurispru-
dential developments on a supranational level can
perhaps shed new light on the value of the Code.
Starting by considering the process whereby the
Code came into being, it should not be forgotten
that it was developed by the Venice Commission
(and, therefore, by a technically inclined body with
a purely advisory role) but on mandate from the per-
manent commission of the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe, which, acting on behalf of
the latter, entrusted the Venice Commission with the
task of ‘‘detecting and recording [.] the principles
of European electoral heritage.’’8 Moreover, the text
(including the Explanatory Report) was approved as
drafted by the same Parliamentary Assembly on Jan-
uary 30, 2003.9 Subsequently, it was also recognized
by the Committee of Ministers with a declaration
adopted on May 13, 2004, in which, among other
things, it was defined as the ‘‘basis for possible further
development of the legal framework for democratic
elections in European countries.’’10 The acknowledg-
ments received by the Code, from a technical body
like the Venice Commission, governments, and
5The Venice Commission adopted also a Code of Good Practice
on Referendums at its 70th plenary session (Venice, Mar. 16–
17, 2007). However, the application of this Code is not consid-
ered in this work.
6The principles of the Code are first listed with a brief descrip-
tion and then developed in an Explanatory Report (also adopted
by the Commission in its plenary session). So as not to confuse
the numbering of the Explanatory Report with that of the rest of
the Code, its parts will be marked as ‘‘ER.’’
7Moreover, it is also recommended that, should the electoral
legislation be changed right before the elections, the new legis-
lation should state that ‘‘the old system will apply to the next
election’’ (x 66 ER).
8See Resolution 1264 of 2001, available at <https://assembly
.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=16962&
lang=en> (last accessed on Jan. 20, 2017).
9See the debate in Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, Official Report of Debates, 2003 Ordinary Session
(first part), 27–31 January 2003, vol. I.
10Available at <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=743357>
(last accessed on Jan. 20, 2017).
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parliamentarians (as well as from the ECtHR after-
wards) point to the significance and authority that
the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters can
enjoy. Moreover, by leaving the issue of its enforce-
ment quite open and being recognized by the Com-
mittee of Ministers as the basis for the future
developments of a (common) European legal frame-
work for democratic elections, as it stems from the
‘‘European electoral heritage,’’ its potential impact
can be stronger than what could be expected, given
its formal legal status.
The influence of the Venice Commission’s opinions
While the drafting of the Code was the result of a
joint venture between the Venice Commission and
the Council of Democratic Elections—a tripartite
body composed ofmembers of theVeniceCommission
itself, members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, and the Congress of Local and
Regional Authorities within the same organization—
the application of the Code, however, has been a
task fulfilled primarily by the Venice Commission
through over a hundred opinions and dozens of stud-
ies on elections.11
Of particular importance are the opinions of the
Venice Commission on draft electoral legislation
and amendments, adopted according to art. 3.2 of
its Revised Statute (reformed before the proclama-
tion of the Code),12 in its advisory capacity, upon
request from a member state, the Committee of
Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly, the Con-
gress of Local and Regional Authorities, or the sec-
retary general.
For example, based on the Code of Good Practice,
the Venice Commission and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe Office for Demo-
cratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR)
recommended a series of amendments to the Electoral
Code of the Republic of Albania of 2009 regarding the
independence and impartiality of electoral commis-
sions at all levels (x x45 and 68 ER), the voting proce-
dures for military and police force personnel (x 81
ER), and the design of the appeal system against elec-
toral results (x 87 ER).13
Moreover, regarding the ban to the entry of polit-
ical parties in Parliament provided for by the elec-
toral rules, the Opinion of the Venice Commission
(and the Commission for Democratic Elections)
on the amendments to the law for the election of
the Parliament of Montenegro in 2010 drew on the
Code to strike an appropriate balance between
the need to ensure the authentic representation of
minorities in Parliament through reserved seats
and the principle of equal suffrage, which indeed
makes it possible to pursue the actual representation
of minorities also by other means.14
By the same token, the Joint Opinion on the
draft electoral law of the Kyrgyz Republic of
2014,15 which is strongly critical of the bill in
many points, also based on the Code, argues that
‘‘the draft law not only fails to address previous
recommendations, but introduces additional re-
strictions on the right to be a candidate for presi-
dent.’’ Indeed, by introducing an extremely strict
requirement, besides many others, of ‘‘at least 15
years residence in the Kyrgyz Republic’’ for a cit-
izen to be elected president, the bill contradicts
what the Code states, namely that ‘‘a length of res-
idence requirement may be imposed on nationals
solely for local or regional elections (I.1.1.c.).’’
These are only three cases in which the Venice
Commission, along with other international bodies,
has drawn on the Code to recommend changes to
the draft electoral legislation, but many more have
been found since 2003.
Finally, on a few occasions the ECtHR has asked
the Venice Commission to deliver an opinion con-
cerning a case under discussion, for instance in
Parti Nationaliste Basque v. France of June 7,
2007, on the prohibition for political parties
11See Jan Wouters et al., Democracy and International Law, in
XXXIV The Netherlands Yearbook of International
Law 149 (2003), and Valentina Volpe, Guaranteeing Electoral
Democratic Standards: The Venice Commission and ‘‘The
Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters,’’ in Global
Administrative Law: The Casebook, 57 (S. Cassese et al.
eds., 2012).
12See Resolution(2002)3—Revised Statute of the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (adopted by the
Committee of Ministers on 21 February 2002 at the 784th meet-
ing of the Ministers’ Deputies).
13See CDL-AD(2009)005, Joint Opinion of the Venice Com-
mission and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) on the Electoral Code of the
Republic of Albania.
14See CDL-AD(2010)023, Joint Opinion of the Venice Com-
mission and the Commission for Democratic Elections on the
Draft Law on Amendments and Supplements to the Law on
the Election of Councillors and Members of Parliament of
Montenegro, paragraphs 19, 28, 51.
15See CDL-AD(2014)019, Joint Opinion of the Venice Com-
mission and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) on the draft electoral law of
the Kyrgyz Republic, paragraphs 43 to 47.
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registered under French law to receive foreign funds
for the electoral competition, in particular by the
Spanish Basque Nationalist Party.16
The use of the Code by the European Court
of Human Rights: ‘‘Harmonization’’
through case law?
It is clearly acknowledged in the Code that it
gathers together the results of the evolving case
law of the ECtHR, also listing the leading cases
that oriented its drafting.17 In turn, because of the
reference of the Code to this case law as an inspira-
tional source, the ECtHR has been using the compre-
hensive synthesis of electoral principles enshrined in
the Code since 2007 to deal with the specific issues
raised by the applicants in concrete cases.
Indeed, four years after the Code’s proclamation
in 2007 the ECtHR eventually started referring to
the Code as a standard for review, although ad adiu-
vandum compared to the main standard for its judg-
ments on electoral matters: art. 3 of Protocol I to the
ECHR. On January 11, 2007, in Russian Conserva-
tive Party of Entrepreneurs and Others v. Russia,18
concerning the allegation against the Central Elec-
toral Commission to act beyond its jurisdiction,
the first section of the ECtHR repeatedly referred
to and quoted the relevant sections of the Code, in
particular regarding the freedom of voters to express
their wishes and to combat electoral fraud and the
corresponding obligation of the state to punish any
kind of electoral fraud (x 3.2).
Since then the Code has been used by the Court in
a variety of cases, in order to uphold the compliance
of national electoral legislation to the ECHR or to de-
tect a violation within majority and concurring opin-
ions. In Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, for instance, the
Grand Chamber held that the electoral threshold of
10% imposed nationally for Turkish parliamentary
elections did not interfere with the free choice of
the people to elect their legislature and hence no vio-
lation of art. 3 of Protocol I had occurred. In doing so,
the Court also relied on the very broad discretion that
the Code leaves in the adoption of an electoral system
as long as the five principles—universal, equal, free,
secret, and direct suffrage—are respected. In fact,
any electoral system can pursue different aims and
has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.19 The
same arguments were used two years later in Ta˘nase
v. Moldova, where the reformed electoral legislation
of banning Moldovan citizens with multiple national-
ities to run for parliamentary elections violated the
European Convention on Nationality and art. 3 Proto-
col I to the ECHR also on the grounds of the Code,
which confirms that ‘‘persons holding dual nationality
must have the same electoral rights as other nation-
als’’ (x 6.b ER).20
As said, the Code has also been used by the Court
to confirm that no infringement of art. 3 Protocol I
to the ECHR took place, as in Sitaropoulos and Gia-
koumopoulos v. Greece, where Greek citizens resid-
ing abroad alleged that their inability to vote for the
Parliament from their place of residence amounted
to disproportionate interference with the exercise
of their right to vote.21 Indeed, from the wording
of the Code as well as from a comparative law anal-
ysis of member states’ legislation, it resulted that
the majority of countries subject the exercise of
the right to vote to residence requirements.22
In addition, in Grosaru v. Romania, the Code was
the center of a dispute between the majority and the
concurring opinion over the interpretation of what is
meant exactly by ‘‘effective system of appeal,’’
following the election.23 The applicant claimed a
violation of art. 13 ECHR—right to an effective
remedy—in conjunction with art. 3 Protocol I to the
ECHR as he had no effective and impartial remedies
against the refusal to gain a seat in Parliament as a
representative of the Italian minority in Romania.24
According to the majority of the Court, the Romanian
electoral legislation violated the invoked review
16See Alessio Pecorario, Argomenti comparativi e giurispru-
denza Cedu: il ruolo della Commissione di Venezia in materia
di diritto elettorale, in Diritticomparati.it (2010). The case was
later decided with the ruling Parti Nationaliste Basque- Organ-
isation Re´gionale D’Iparralde v. France, No. 71251/01,
ECtHR 2007.
17In detail, refer to the rulings Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v.
Belgium, No. 9267/81, ECtHR 1987-1, and Gitonas and Others
v. Greece, Nos. 18747/91, 19376/92, 19379/92, ECtHR 1997,
concerning the universality and equality of the vote.
18Paragraphs 37 and 38 of the judgment. The case became final
on April 11, 2007.
19Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey [GC], No. 10226/03, x 54-55,
ECtHR 2008.
20Ta˘nase v. Moldova [GC], No. 7/08, x 86, ECtHR 2010.
21Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece [GC], No.
42202/07, x 22, ECtHR 2012, paragraph 22.
22See point I.1.1.c.v of the Code.
23Grosaru v. Romania, No. 78039/01, xx 22 and 56, ECtHR
2010, paragraphs 22 and 56.
24The seat, instead, was assigned by the Central Electoral
Office to a representative of the same community who had
obtained a lower percentage of votes (paragraph 9 of the
ruling).
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standards as no court could intervene in the proceed-
ing, whereas the Code ‘‘recommends judicial review
of the application of electoral rules, possibly in addi-
tion to appeals to the electoral commissions or before
parliament.’’25 By contrast, in the concurring opinion
Judge Ziemele argued that, based on chapter 3.3. of
the Code, ‘‘an effective appeal can exist where such
appeals are heard not only by courts but also by elec-
toral commissions’’ and, hence, ‘‘the fact that no judi-
cial appeal was available in general, and to the
applicant in particular, is not sufficient to answer
the question that Article 13 ECHR poses.’’26
However, a later ruling is of the utmost interest
for our purposes. In Ekoglasnost v. Bulgaria,27 the
Court actually invoked the Code in relation to
point II.2.b., concerning the stability of electoral
rights in the period immediately prior to the con-
sultations. Furthermore, the Court considered the
Code as a minimum limit that cannot be trans-
gressed by the legislation of the member states.
The Code identifies three types of fundamental
rules for the electoral process and ‘‘prohibits’’
amendments during the year preceding the elec-
tions (and, should this be the case, it recommends
such amendment be included in a source placed
above ordinary legislation). According to these
preconditions, the Court confirmed the link be-
tween conventional legality and the stability of
the Bulgarian cardinal rules on the voting system
during the pre-electoral year, as such changes
could lead to the perception of a link with contin-
gent interests, which, in extreme cases, could
‘‘benefit the political parties in power’’ and there-
fore constitute a ‘‘practice incompatible with dem-
ocratic order.’’28 Moreover, the Court stressed that
the Code’s list (detailing the methods for electoral
scrutiny, the composition of electoral commis-
sions, and the division of polling stations into
constituencies) is not exhaustive, and further re-
quirements can be added in relation to the condi-
tions for political parties to participate in the
elections. Finally—although in this regard the
new conditions for taking part in the elections
were recognized as pursuing legitimate scopes29—
the Court found that they had only been introduced
two months before the elections and therefore
within a shorter timeframe than the year identified
by the Code. As a consequence, for the sole reason
of having been introduced ‘‘late,’’ the amendments
to the Bulgarian electoral law were considered as
violating art. 3 of Protocol I to the ECHR.30
WEAKNESSES AND LIMITS OF THE CODE
The advisory function of the Venice
Commission and the marginal use
of the Code in the ECtHR case law
Despite the use of the Code by the Venice Commis-
sion and the ECtHR to promote a progressive ‘‘harmo-
nization’’ of electoral rights in Europe, the Code is
affected by a series of weaknesses and limits.
First of all, as for the advisory activity of the Venice
Commission, it is worth recalling that the latter cannot
act on its own initiative: rather, it can only be requested
to deliver an opinion by specific institutions, bodies, or
states. Moreover, its opinions mainly deal with devel-
oping democracies involved with an overall reform of
their electoral legislation. Only occasionally are the
addressees of the Venice Commission’s opinions the
authorities of more consolidated European democra-
cies, usually when the national government itself
asks for the intervention of the Commission.31
With regard to the application of the Code in the
ECtHR jurisprudence, three different limits can be
found to its possible pushes to the ‘‘harmonization’’
of electoral rights.
First, Ekoglasnost v. Bulgaria raises the alert that
a violation of the Code may remain unsanctioned
within the legal system of the Council of Europe if
just the Venice Commission is involved in ascertain-
ing ex ante the compliance of new electoral rules and
the Court is not asked to intervene afterwards. More-
over, the Code seems to resort to a list of minimum
standards that are therefore susceptible to further
extension by the ECtHR. In other words, the applica-
tion of the Code definitely benefits from being used
by the ECtHR rather than by the Venice Commission
only, the effectiveness of whose opinions remains
much more uncertain than the follow-up of the
Court’s judgments.
25Grosaru v. Romania, x 56.
26Grosaru v. Romania, concurring opinion of Judge Ziemele, x 5.
27Ekoglasnost v. Bulgaria, No. 30386/05, ECtHR 2012.
28Ekoglasnost v. Bulgaria, x 69.
29Ivi, x 64.
30Ivi, xx 7 and 72.
31See, for instance, the Opinion of the Venice Commission of
23 June 2015 on a Citizens’ Bill on Public Participation, Citi-
zens’ Bills, Referendums and Popular Initiatives and Amend-
ments to the Provincial Electoral Law of the Autonomous
Province of Trento (CDL-AD(2015)009), requested by the
Presidency of the Italian Council of Ministers.
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Second, the enforcement of the Code through the
Court promotes only a limited ‘‘harmonization’’ of a
European ius commune in electoral matters. When
coming to electoral issues, in fact, the review stan-
dards are usually those already mentioned in art. 3
of Protocol I as well as in arts. 13 and 14 (non-
discrimination) of the ECHR, and the Code is man-
aged by the European judges as an interpretative aid.
Finally, the Code is cited or quoted only in a lim-
ited number of cases dealing with elections and vot-
ing rights and, for instance, the very much discussed
and famous Hirst (No. 2),32 on the automatic disen-
franchisement of prisoners in the UK (besides simi-
lar cases affecting other member states), completely
neglects the contribution of the Code to the point.
The inconsistency among the official linguistic
versions of the Code: The case of the Italian
translation
Although the developments in both the activity of
the Venice Commission and the ECtHR case law
have fostered a convergence in the principles of
electoral legislation across Europe, such a conver-
gence is still limited on many electoral issues.
This is the case, for example, of the systems of ap-
peal against (contested) electoral results to which
the Code dedicates a chapter within its Part II, sig-
nificantly titled ‘‘Conditions for the effectiveness
of the principles contained in the first part.’’ There-
fore, the existence and feasibility of actions against
the alleged violation of the principles enshrined in
the Code are considered a precondition for the ef-
fectiveness of the principles themselves. In this
field a clear difference appears between the Italian
linguistic (official) version of the Code on the sys-
tems of appeal (x II.3.3.a, second sentence), mod-
elled on the peculiar system for the parliamentary
verification of the election in force in Italy and
grounded in art. 66 of the Italian Constitution, and
the other linguistic versions (English, French, Ger-
man, and Russian). Indeed, art. 66 of the Italian
Constitution, which has been repeatedly criticized
by international observers,33 forbids the appeal to
courts (either ordinary, special, or other kinds) to
challenge the results of parliamentary elections.34
All the language versions of the Code other than
the Italian one agree that while an intervention by
the Parliament as a site for resolving any disputes
that may arise during the electoral process may be
admissible in a ‘‘first instance,’’ ‘‘in any case’’ the
appeal to a judicial authority must be foreseen. By
contrast, while the Italian version of the Code con-
siders that ‘‘in all other cases [other than parliamen-
tary elections], an appeal before a court must be
possible as a last resort,’’ it immediately sets an ex-
ception to this rule for the case of the elections to the
Houses of Parliament. Paradoxically, the Italian ver-
sion of the Explanatory Report to the Code is coher-
ent with the others, and an appeal before Parliaments
‘‘is acceptable as a first instance in places where it is
long established, but a judicial appeal should then be
possible’’ (x 94 ER, so contradicting x II.3.3.a).
This patent inconsistency appears difficult to jus-
tify unless attributing it to either a simple mistake or
a (quite disputable) decision by jurilinguists at themo-
ment of drafting the Code, who gave precedence to
the compliance with Italian constitutional law in the
Italian version rather than to the standardization of a
comparable formula with other languages. The conse-
quences of such discrepancy on the interpretation of
the Code are not easy to identify. The most suitable
solution would be to apply the criteria encoded in
art. 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties in relation to the interpretation of the treaties au-
thenticated in two or more languages. In this context,
it is stipulated that ‘‘when a comparison of authentic
texts reveals a difference in meaning,’’ ‘‘complemen-
tary means of interpretation’’ must be used, such as
preparatory works and practices developed in the
meantime. From this point of view, the preparatory
works for the Code confirm the impression that the
anomaly should be identified in the Italian version.
The preliminary works of the Venice Commission
on the Code show that, although the appeal to the par-
liamentary bodies against electoral results had been
considered (at least in more established democracies),
32Hirst (No. 2) v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 74025/01,
ECtHR 2005.
33Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,
Italy. Parliamentary Elections 9–10 April 2006. Election
Assessment Mission Report (Warsaw, June 9, 2006), at 21:
‘‘Notwithstanding the constitutional basis for the existing com-
plaint procedure, the new parliament should consider measures
to provide for impartial and timely resolution of electoral dis-
putes, including the possibility of an appeal to a court.’’
34In this regard, see Nicola Lupo, Considerazioni conclusive.
Sistema elettorale e legislazione ‘‘di contorno,’’ in Le evolu-
zioni della legislazione elettorale ‘‘di contorno’’ in
Europa. Atti del III Colloquio italo-polacco sulle
trasformazioni istituzionali, 426 (Gian C. De Martin
et al. eds., 2011).
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it concluded that an appeal before the courts consti-
tutes the ‘‘best response’’ and (as a minimum stan-
dard) the existence of an appeal to courts can be
‘‘equally acceptable.’’35
CONCLUSIONS
The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters
somewhat assumes that a ‘‘European electoral heri-
tage’’ common to the member states, as results from
its text (Part I), is already in existence and consti-
tutes a tie among the countries of the Council of
Europe. However, does the Code actually advance
the consolidation of a ius commune on elections in
Europe? For the time being the answer to this ques-
tion appears nuanced.
First of all, the non-binding nature of the Code
paralleled by the way it is drafted, i.e., by recogniz-
ing shared principles and values, are on the one hand
elements that favor its accreditation as a set of au-
thoritative guidelines for electoral reforms, but on
the other hand, they cause the lack of appropriate en-
forcement mechanisms.
Second, and related to this, is the role of the Ven-
ice Commission, which has been a major champion
in the promotion of the Code. Nevertheless, as the
opinions of the Venice Commission are delivered
upon the request of other institutions, bodies, or
states, they usually address electoral issues prefera-
bly towards states that are democracies in transition
or in consolidation. Moreover, as its opinions are
devoid of binding effects, the Venice Commission
alone is not able to ensure the application of the
Code in those countries where a more correct and
effective implementation of it is recommended.
Third, the ECtHR has endorsed the importance of
the Code through its case law, a development that
could not be taken for granted in 2003. This not-
withstanding, the use of the Code by the Court is
not systematic in all the cases concerning electoral
issues and is only ad adiuvandum vis-a`-vis legally
binding parameters for review enshrined in the
ECHR and its protocols. Of course, the Court
could develop its case law further and manage the
Code as providing a set of inalienable standards
for national electoral legislation, whose violation
does not tolerate any leeway for the use of the mar-
gin of appreciation doctrine. However, this has not
happened so far.
Finally, there is a further element that makes the
‘‘harmonization’’ of the principles of electoral legisla-
tion in Europe through the Code problematic. This is
the difference between themany linguistic versions of
the Code that impairs the very ability of this instru-
ment to provide common guidelines on electoral is-
sues for all the member states. If the contents of the
Code vary according to the national legal framework
on elections, then the aspiration to acknowledge and
foster Europe’s electoral heritage is undermined.
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